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www.econstor.eu In contrast to the traditional money view, according to which monetary policy is transmitted through changes in bank liabilities, the credit view emphasises an additional transmission channel, the bank lending channel, which allows central bank actions to affect the supply of credit from banks and, in turn, real spending in the economy. Empirical studies, using mainly US data, have found that bank characteristics, such as asset size, liquidity (or balance sheet strength) and capitalisation, are important in assessing the impact of monetary policy on loan growth and in determining its distributional effects.
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W O R K I N G PA P E R S E R I E S
This paper examines the role played by Greek banks in the transmission of monetary policy and assesses the importance of cross-sectional differences in bank characteristics for the operation of the bank lending channel, using monthly panel data that cover the second half of the 1990s.
Two approaches have been taken for analysing the role of banks in monetary transmission.
One employing a reduced form equation linking monetary policy and distributional variables, as well as their interaction, to bank loans in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein's work. Two indicators of cross-sectional differences were used: a size indicator, differentiating large from small banks, and an indicator of the health of bank balance sheets. The results, while compatible with the existence of a bank lending channel, were in general not satisfactory. In an alternative approach, it was argued that bank heterogeneity, though useful in accounting for loan supply shifts, is not the only element on which to base the analysis of the effectiveness of the lending channel. By bringing together some of the features of the Bernanke -Blinder model with a methodology for assessing the impact of differential balance sheet characteristics on banks' ability to supply loans, we investigated directly the behaviour of bank loan supply.
The empirical results of this second approach show that monetary policy clearly has a significant impact on the supply of bank loans and, through shifts in supply, on aggregate economic activity in Greece. Bank data helped us identify a loan supply function, a task that presents well-known difficulties for researchers. The response of loan supply to the spread between the loan rate and the bond rate is one of the critical parameters in the Bernanke -Blinder model that relates to the degree of substitutability between loans and securities (for banks) and thus to the significance of the lending channel. In addition, bank-specific characteristics were found to systematically shift the loan supply function. The results showed that large banks can, to a certain extent, shield their loan portfolio from monetary policy changes. Similar results hold for the more liquid (healthy) banks. 
Non-technical summary
E
Introduction
Considerable research has recently examined the role played by banks in the transmission of monetary policy. In contrast to the traditional money view, according to which monetary policy is transmitted through changes in bank liabilities, the credit view emphasises an additional transmission channel, the bank lending channel, which allows central bank actions to affect the supply of credit from banks and, in turn, real spending in the economy. However, difficulties in distinguishing shifts in loan supply from shifts in loan demand have complicated the task of uncovering a lending channel at the aggregate level. Thus, the evidence from studies using aggregate data was supplemented by an analysis of the distributional effects of monetary policy changes. The question that empirical studies have sought to answer is whether there are important cross-sectional differences in the way that banks with varying characteristics respond to policy shocks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) . Bank characteristics that were found to be important in assessing the impact of monetary policy on loan growth and in determining its distributional effects were asset size, liquidity (or balance sheet strength) and capitalisation.
This paper examines the implications of differential bank characteristics for the loan supply behaviour of Greek banks, using monthly panel data that cover the second half of the 1990s, and assesses the importance of these cross-sectional differences for the operation of the bank lending channel. It is argued that bank heterogeneity, while useful in accounting for loan supply shifts, is not the only, and indeed not the most important element on which the search for an aggregate bank lending channel could be based.
The paper is divided as follows: Section 2 contains a discussion of the time series evidence on the existence of the lending channel, followed by a brief survey of studies using disaggregated bank data and their usefulness in identifying loan supply shifts. Section 3 presents an overview of recent developments in the Greek banking system and its characteristics that may be pertinent to the operation of the lending channel. Section 4 uses two approaches for analysing the role of banks in monetary transmission. One employing a reduced form equation linking monetary policy and distributional variables to bank loans in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein's work. The other, which in general yields more satisfactory results, brings together some of the features of the Bernanke-Blinder model with a method for assessing the impact of differential balance-sheet characteristics on banks' ability to supply loans and investigates directly the behaviour of bank loan supply. This section also discusses data issues and presents estimation results by applying panel cointegration methods, which indicate the importance of the lending channel for the Greek economy and of bank specific characteristics in accounting for a differentiated response of loans to monetary policy changes. Finally, Section 5 summarises the main conclusions. The bank lending channel is a separate channel that reinforces the operation of the money channel for monetary policy transmission. Its existence is predicated on capital market imperfections arising inter alia from asymmetric information. To the extent that the bank lending channel operates, monetary policy can influence aggregate demand not only through interest rates as in the traditional money channel, but also through its impact on the supply of bank loans. When monetary policy tightens, bank deposits fall and the loan supply schedule shifts upwards, which enhances the interest rate-induced effect on aggregate demand. This effect on loan supply should be clearly distinguished from loan demand contraction and the inward shift of the loan demand schedule associated with the fall in output that higher interest rates entail.
E C B • W o r k i n g P
The bank lending channel has been theoretically analysed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) in a model that expands the conventional IS-LM framework by taking into account the bank loan market. Loans and bonds are assumed to be imperfect substitutes both for borrowers and banks. This implies that, along with the bond rate, the bank lending rate is also introduced in the analysis, as it influences loan demand and supply and the demand for output. A key result of the Bernanke -Blinder model is that there is no bank lending channel when (i) loan supply is perfectly elastic with respect to the loan rate, i.e. loans and bonds are perfect substitutes in bank portfolios, or (ii) loan demand is perfectly elastic with respect to the loan rate, or output demand does not respond to changes in the loan rate, both cases implying that borrowers view loan and bond financing as perfect substitutes. Note that when these conditions are satisfied, the demand for and the supply of loans cannot be defined separately from the corresponding demand for and supply of bonds.
The implications of the Bernanke -Blinder model are not easy to test empirically, and thus obtaining "sharp measurements of the (channel's) potency is a challenging task" (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, p.42) . A number of studies over the last decade have indirectly tested for the existence of the bank lending channel by examining timing relationships either between quantity variables (output, loans, money and other bank or firm balance sheet items) or between price variables (interest rates or interest rate differentials). Following the first route, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) have applied VAR analysis to US data to examine the impulse response functions of bank loans, securities and deposits to a positive innovation in the Federal funds rate. Their results showed (i) an immediate decline in the volume of securities and deposits and a delayed decline in the volume of bank loans, and (ii) over a somewhat longer time span , a rebuilding of bank securities holdings and a further decline in loans, essentially matching the decline in deposits. These results were felt to be consistent with a credit channel, but also with a money channel, since loans responded with the same lag as unemployment to the monetary policy shock.
In an attempt to separate the effect of loan demand from loan supply, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (KSW, 1993) examined movements in the mix between bank loans and a close substitute (i.e. commercial paper) for bank finance to firms, following changes in monetary policy. According to the authors, the bank lending channel makes the following prediction: a tightening of monetary policy would cause the supply of bank loans to decline by more than the supply of commercial paper, whereas the composition of firms' external finance would not be affected if monetary policy operated solely through the money channel. KSW found evidence that tight monetary policy leads to an increase in commercial paper issuance while bank loans slowly decline. Rudebusch (1995, 1996) questioned the usefulness of changes in the aggregate financing mix as an indicator of the operation of the bank lending channel. They instead proposed an alternative explanation: monetary tightening does not only reduce the demand for all types of external finance but it also redirects all types of credit from small firms to large firms, which rely more heavily on commercial paper financing. In this case, commercial paper issuance may rise relative to bank loans even when the supply of bank loans remains unchanged. Thus, heterogeneity in loan demand rather than shifts in loan supply would explain a change in the mix between bank and non-bank financing. Using data for the US manufacturing sector, Oliner and Rudebusch found almost no evidence that a monetary shock changes the composition of bank and non-bank debt for either small or large firms, which is not consistent with the existence of a bank lending channel. In response to this criticism, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1996) reported that even among large firms there appears to be substitution away from bank loans to commercial paper after a monetary policy contraction. Their statistical results, however, are not very robust; when the federal funds rate is used as the monetary policy indicator, they do not support the existence of the bank lending channel as is also the case with Oliner and Rudebusch's paper. A common limitation of all studies dealing with the issue of the existence of a bank lending channel through the estimation of timing relationships is that they concentrate on relatively shortterm responses, which may not be very informative in view of the fact that banks are prevented from adjusting their loans stock quickly after a monetary policy change, due to loan commitments and other contractual agreements (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, p. 919), and that the observed responses may admit alternative interpretations, not necessarily restricted to supply of credit shifts.
The difficulties in distinguishing shifts in loan demand from shifts in loan supply have prompted researchers to focus on panel data to explore some of the cross-sectional implications of the lending view, namely that the responses of banks and firms to changes in monetary policy may differ, depending on their characteristics. In particular as regards banks, the existing evidence indicates that, due to agency and/or search costs, they may experience increasing costs of non-deposit external finance, which are higher for small banks. Thus, small banks are expected to be affected more from a monetary contraction.
Kashyap and Stein (1995) using US data, tested the hypothesis that, after a monetary contraction, the lending volume of small banks declines more rapidly than that of large banks (i.e. d 2 L it /dM it dsize it <0). Their empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis, as the estimated coefficient on the monetary policy variable, which gives an indication about the operation of the lending channel, declines with size. However, the coefficient for large banks was positive and insignificant, indicating that for this group of banks the lending channel may not be important. Large banks were defined as those representing the top 1% of all banks and their assets accounted for 55% of the total system assets. As estimation results are not presented for another part of the sample (the 99th percentile of bank distribution) accounting for approximately 8% of the system's assets, there is potentially a total of 63% of the system's assets, controlled by banks for which a lending channel for monetary policy transmission may not exist. This in turn would cast doubt on the importance of the lending channel for aggregate economic activity.
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One problem with the above test is that banks with a large buffer stock of liquid assets can partly, if not completely, insulate their loans from the effects of monetary policy. For a bank of a given size, a tightening of monetary policy would cause loans to decline less, the more liquid is the bank (i.e. d 3 L it /dM it dsize it dB it >0). In this case, the bank would have a larger buffer stock of cash and securities, which it can draw down to shield its loan portfolio. Kashyap and Stein (2000) reported that small banks are on average more liquid than large banks and this mitigates the effectiveness of the bank lending channel for these banks. Indeed, by separating banks by asset size and liquidity, Kashyap and Stein found that small banks with the least liquid balance sheet were the most responsive to policy.
Kishan and Opiela's (2000) paper extended the above analysis to include, along with the asset size, an additional differentiating characteristic -a bank's degree of capitalization. The role of bank capital is twofold. It is an indicator of bank health and, therefore, an indicator of a bank's ability to raise funds from alternative sources during contractionary policy. Moreover, prudential supervision, and in particular capital adequacy requirements, may affect the composition of bank asset portfolios, in the sense that well capitalized banks are less constrained during periods of tight monetary policy, since these banks can isolate, to some extent, their loan portfolio from monetary shocks. Kishan and Opiela, using a model of a representative bank, came to the conclusion that the effect of capital on the response of loans to monetary policy changes is positive. Thus, the better capitalized a bank is, the less responsive its loans will be to changes in policy (i.e. d 2 L it /dM it dK it >0). Their empirical results provide strong evidence that the smallest and least capitalized banks are the most responsive to monetary policy, a finding consistent with loan supply shifts for this category of banks. However, for larger banks, accounting for about 80% of the system's assets, loan responses to monetary policy changes are not statistical significant, suggesting that a bank lending channel may not hold in total.
The tests of the lending channel discussed above that are based on bank characteristics were limited to US data. Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999) empirically investigated the existence of a lending channel for Europe also using disaggregated bank data. They tested the same hypotheses as Kashyap and Stein (2000) for four European countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), with cross-section data for 1992 and bank reserves as the monetary policy variable. Overall, they found no evidence of a lending channel in these countries. For certain size groups, however, their results were counter-intuitive. For example, they found that small banks in Germany, Italy and France use their excess liquidity to expand loans in the presence of monetary policy tightening, contrary to the prediction of the bank lending hypothesis.
A potential problem with studies examining cross section differences in the response to monetary policy is that estimates may be affected by endogeneity bias. For instance, the balance sheet strength variable may be endogenous in that banks which lend to cyclically sensitive customers may hold a larger buffer stock of liquid assets to protect themselves from the greater risk they assume. Other banks which are more conservative may hold a larger stock of liquid assets as a result of a reduction in loans to cyclically sensitive customers. Kashyap and Stein (2000) suggested a two step procedure to remove this bias.
The bottom line of the above review is that heterogeneity bears on the importance of the bank lending channel as differential balance sheet characteristics are tied to banks ability to supply loans (Kishan and Opiela, 2000) . Nevertheless, it does not constitute the only element on which the search for a bank lending channel can be based.
The structure of the Greek banking sector
Banks in Greece have historically played a dominant role in channelling financial savings from surplus to deficit economic units, whereas the relative importance of other financial institutions, such as mutual funds and insurance companies, in financial intermediation was until recently very limited, but is currently increasing. The special role of banks in financial intermediation was further enhanced by the following features of the financial system. First, banks were highly regulated, and detailed selective rules and restrictions governed the distribution of bank credit to economic sectors until the mid-1980s. Moreover, until December 1990, commercial banks were required to invest 40% of their drachma deposits in government securities, mainly 3-month Treasury bills. This investment requirement was phased out at the margin by end-1993 and banks converted their accumulated Treasury bill holdings into negotiable medium-term government bonds. However, the relatively thin market for government securities did not allow banks to sell a large part of their portfolio of these securities without incurring substantial capital losses. Second, the scope for financing through the capital market was also very limited, as the Stock Exchange was not very developed until the beginning of the 1990s. Third, various restrictions had been imposed on external transactions and in particular on capital flows. Important developments in financial markets abroad, and the need to transpose the relevant EU Directives into domestic law and modernise the Greek financial system led to the gradual liberalisation of financial markets and external transactions, a process that was essentially completed by the mid-1990s. As a result, bank intermediation has relatively declined, whereas the stock market and mutual funds have displayed very rapid growth. Banks have tried to counter this trend through financial innovations. Examples of this are the development of synthetic swaps 2 and the increase in banks' off-balance sheet items,
The above discussion suggests that, prior to the recent harmonisation of the reserve requirement system, banks operating in Greece had only very limited possibilities to isolate their fund raising activities from the effects of monetary policy shocks and thus to maintain their loan supply unchanged. The only possibility open to them was to resort to the stock market for raising share capital, but this procedure could not be used flexibly, given the institutional procedures that have to be followed for increasing share capital. On 2 Synthetic swaps were developed in the early 1990s mainly for tax avoidance reasons. A synthetic swap involved the transfer of an amount of funds to a term deposit account denominated in a foreign currency with a bank abroad and the simultaneous forward selling of the principal and the interest for drachmas. The difference between the spot and the forward exchange rates is treated as capital gains by tax authorities and is not taxed. 3 Greek commercial banks' off-balance sheet items as a percentage of total assets: 1993: 53%, 2000: 154%.
the other hand, the scope for substituting loans for securities appears to have been minimal until the mid-1990s, but it has increased considerably after financial liberalisation was completed. Thus, the bank lending channel is expected to have been especially potent in the period before the liberalisation of the banking system, but to have weakened thereafter. Indeed, the available time series evidence based on the relationship between output, money and credit for the period 1972-1996 indicates that a strong lending channel existed in the earlier part of that period but its importance subsequently diminished with the financial liberalisation (Brissimis and Kastrissianakis, 1997).
Kashyap and Stein (1997), on the basis of four indicators of the relative importance of the bank lending channel in the EU countries (EU-12), classified Greece as a country where the bank lending channel is more likely to work. The first indicator refers to the concentration of the banking system: the more concentrated the system, the less sensitive is expected to be its responsiveness to monetary policy shocks, given that large banks can more easily substitute other liabilities that are not subject to reserve requirements and/or are uninsured, for deposits. The second indicator is the rate of return on bank assets: other things being equal, the more capitalised a bank, the higher its expected profitability, since the cost its funds is relatively lower. 4 On the other hand, well capitalised banks should have an easier access to capital markets to raise funds in the event of a deposit shock, implying that monetary policy would have less of an impact on those banks. The third indicator relates to the size of firms: smaller firms are more dependent on bank financing than larger firms, as monitoring costs for small firms are so high that they would have difficulties in securing non-bank financing. Thus, for a given contraction of bank credit, these firms will be affected more. Finally, the fourth indicator refers to the importance of non-bank financing, in particular equity and bond financing. Where the availability of non-bank financing is greater, the efficacy of the bank lending channel is likely to be less. Table 1 provides information on the structure of the Greek banking system according to various characteristics at the end of 1998. Commercial banks constitute the most important segment of the Greek banking sector, their share in total bank assets being 88.2%, while the share of specialised credit institutions is a little above 10%. Cooperative banks hold a very low percentage (0.3%) of total bank assets, although their number has been increasing in recent years.
The degree of concentration of the Greek banking system is relatively high, given that the share of the three larger banks in total bank assets is almost 50%, while that of the banks at the bottom 50 per cent of the distribution of their total assets is only 3.8%. However, Greek banks are rather small according to an absolute size criterion as only 5 fall into the "large bank" category, i.e. total assets larger than Є 6 billion, while there are 14 banks, each with total assets not exceeding Є 50 million, which make up almost all of the bottom quartile. As shown in Table 1 , loans to the non-MFI private sector as a percentage of total assets is higher in the case of small banks according to both absolute and relative size criteria. On the contrary, holdings of securities represent a smaller percentage of the total assets in smaller banks rather than in larger banks, indicating that the latter are relatively more liquid. Furthermore, the share of deposits in total liabilities is higher in the case of larger banks, but smaller banks are better capitalised.
As regards capitalisation, poorly capitalised banks rely on deposits more than well capitalised banks. However, the ratio of loans to the non-MFI private sector to total assets of well capitalised banks is higher, indicating that capital adequacy considerations may
Empirical evidence
The role of banks in the transmission process and the importance of differential bank characteristics as regards the response of bank loans to a monetary tightening can be empirically investigated by using the following specification based on Kashyap and Stein (1995):
∆L it = ∑ j a j ∆L i,t-j + ∑ j b j ∆r t-j + ∑ j c j Z i,t-1 ∆r t-j + dZ i,t-1 + ∑ j e j ∆W t-j + v i + ε it (1) where L i,t are real loans (in logs), r t is a monetary policy interest rate, Z it is a bank specific characteristic, W t is a vector of control variables, v i represents individual bank effects, and ε it is the error term. Subscripts i and t refer to specific banks and time period, respectively. Equation (1) is the typical reduced form equation of a bank that is compatible with the existence of a bank lending channel and in which differential bank characteristics play an important role in shifting the banks' loan supply function. The parameters of interest in this equation are the b j 's and c j 's, which are assumed to be the same across banks. A monetary tightening is expected to reduce lending, hence ∑ j b j should be negative. Large and liquid banks are expected to be able to better shield their loans from monetary shocks by using their buffer of liquid assets and/or by attracting funds from non-deposit sources. Thus, ∑ j c j is expected to be positive. Individual bank characteristics other than those represented by Z i are captured by the fixed effect term v i.
Panel data on balance sheet items for Greek banks have been used to estimate equation (1). The sample includes monthly observations covering the period January 1995 to December 1999 for 12 commercial banks representing all sizes. Although the sample contains only 20% of all banks operating in Greece, at end-1999 the share of these banks in total assets, loans, and deposits of the banking system was 57%, 59%, and 68%, respectively. Bank data had to be adjusted for two mergers that occurred in the later part of 1999. Merged banks were assumed to remain independent and the relevant data after the merger were allocated to each of the banks according to the pattern observed immediately prior to their merging. 5 All balance sheet variables were deflated by the consumer price index, seasonally adjusted and expressed in logs. The 3-month money market rate (Athibor) is used as the monetary policy variable. As a control variable we used an index of real GDP constructed on the basis of annual national accounts data and available monthly indicators of economic activity for the main sectors of the economy. 6 The effects of bank specific characteristics are examined by using a balance sheet strength (liquidity) and a size variable. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets LQ i,t (cash, deposits held with other banks and securities) to total assets A i,t . Bank size is measured by total assets. The bank characteristic variables are defined as deviations from the crosssectional mean at each time period in the case of the size variable, so as to remove its trend, or the overall mean in the case of the bank strength variable, which does not have a trend:
The system of equations (1) was estimated by using SUR weighted least squares (sometimes referred to as the Parks estimator) which is appropriate when residuals are both cross section heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated. 7 Furthermore, in order to reduce possible multicolliniarity problems, we discarded the inflation rate and the interaction terms with inflation which were much less significant. We ended up retaining three lags for the other variables. Also, we included the 12th lag of the rate of growth of loans in order to capture any seasonality that had not been removed. Finally, a dummy variable was included to account for the impact of the turbulence in the foreign exchange market in November 1997 that followed the financial crisis in Russia.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 . The direct impact of monetary policy on loans has the correct sign but is not significant in either equation. The effect of the interaction of the monetary policy variable with each bank characteristic also has the correct sign and is significant only in the case of the liquidity variable, indicating that more liquid banks can better shield their loan portfolio from monetary policy changes.
Empirical work based on equation (1) above appears in our view to have two limitations: first, it relies on a reduced form relating loans to a monetary policy variable, which does not allow the identification of the parameters of the structural model-the Bernanke and Blinder model-that are relevant to the existence of the lending channel. Moreover, measurement biases may be introduced from the use of explanatory variables, such as GDP, data on which have only a time dimension. Second, variables are expressed in first difference form, not taking into account possible equilibrium relationships.
An alternative approach would consist in trying to estimate directly the banks' loan supply function. The discussion in Section 2 above has shown that the identification of this function is critical to the empirical investigation of the bank lending channel and panel data can be useful in uncovering certain aspects of bank behaviour which may be related to its existence.
Assuming that the loan market is competitive, we can specify the following equilibrium loan supply function for the individual bank i:
where L it and D it are real loans and deposits (in logs) of bank i in period t, and ρ t and i t are the lending rate and the bond rate in period t.
Equation (4) is consistent with the aggregate loan supply function in the BernankeBlinder's model discussed above. In this specification, loans depend on the interest rate spread, assuming that there is rate of return homogeneity of degree zero which implies that, when all interest rates rise by the same amount, banks do not change the composition of their portfolios. Furthermore, the lending rate variable only has a time dimension, since in a competitive market the individual bank takes the price (interest rate) as given. 8 The sensitivity of loan supply to the interest rate spread (i.e. the parameter β) is one of the three parameters in the Bernanke and Blinder's model which determine the lending channel's potency. When β → ∞, loans and bonds are perfect substitutes for banks (ρ = i) and there is no bank lending channel. Deposits are the scale variable in (4).
The effect of bank characteristics can be introduced via the coefficient on (ρ t -i t ) or D it . Assuming that bank characteristics affect loan supply by differentiating the loan response to changes in deposits, we can assume that:
where Z it is a bank specific characteristic, for example its balance sheet strength. In terms of the Bernanke -Blinder's model, this is translated into shifts of the loan supply function and, consequently, of the CC curve according to cross-sectional differences. 9 Substituting equation (5) into equation (4) we obtain: (6) As in the previous model, distributional effects will be explored by using the same balance sheet and size variables. The effect of asset size on the sensitivity of loan supply to policyinduced shifts in deposits is expected to be negative (γ 1 <0): larger banks may find it easier to raise non-deposit finance and thus partly offset the effects of contractionary policy on loans. This makes the shift parameter γ i smaller, implying a weakened lending channel. Similarly, banks which hold higher ratios of liquid to total assets can better insulate their loan portfolio against monetary shocks. This means that the response of loans to monetary policy would be smaller for these banks and, as a result, the lending channel would be less important. As noted in Section 3, for a bank of a given size, the tightening of monetary policy would cause loans to decline less, the more liquid is the bank. To capture this effect, the interaction term Z it B it will be introduced in equation (5) with an expected positive coefficient.
Equation (6) can be considered as a loan supply function incorporating the effects of differential bank characteristics and will be the basis for the empirical analysis. To deal with the issue of non-stationarity of the variables involved and the possible existence of a cointegrating relationship between them we estimated a linear single equation error correction model. 10 8 This implies that for the estimation of the loan supply function of the individual bank the simultaneity problem arising from the interaction of loan demand and loan supply, and the identification problem do not exist. Of course, to the extent that the bank loan market is imperfectly competitive the results will suffer from estimation biases. However, the perfect competition assumption is commonly made in all studies of the bank lending channel. 9 Had we introduced the effect of differentiated bank characteristics through the coefficient on the interest rate spread, this would have affected both the slope and the position of the CC curve. 10 Alternatively, the non-linear least squares (NLS) single equation estimation method for the simple ECM specification, suggested by Phillips and Loretan (1991), could be used, which gives asymptotically efficient and median unbiased estimates of long-run equilibrium relationships. For an application of this method, see Chinn (1997) and Chinn and Johnston (1997) .
where φ i,0 is a bank specific constant capturing the effect of bank specific variables not included in the cointegrating relationship, ECT is the residual of the cointegrating equation and X is the vector of the right hand side variables in equation (6) . In order to have a parsimonious representation of the error correction model, the lag length was restricted to one, 11 which was sufficient to ensure that residuals were not autocorrelated. We estimated the cointegrating relationship without bank specific effects in the constant term and with homogeneity imposed across the slope coefficients. The cointegrating vector defines residuals that are stationary. To test for stationarity, the differenced residual is regressed on the lagged residual and bank dummies:
The t-statistic on the δ coefficient is then compared to the critical value given in Table 5 of Levin and Lin (1992) . If the t-statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis of nonstationarity and hence of no cointegration can be rejected.
The estimated cointegrating relationships with distributional effects are shown in Table 3 .
As with the previous model, SUR weighted least squares were used in all estimations. The t statistic for testing for cointegration is given at the bottom of this Table. It indicates that the null hypothesis of no-cointegration can be rejected in all cases. As already mentioned, bank characteristics included in the regressions are the bank size (S it ) and the balance sheet strength (B it ). The interaction terms of these variables with deposits (D it ) give an indication of the importance of distributional effects in shifting the loan supply function. Interaction terms always have the expected sign and in most of the cases are significant. Equation 1 in Table 3 shows that large banks are able to partly insulate their loan portfolio from a monetary policy tightening. Similar results are found for the more liquid banks (Table 3, equation 2 ). Furthermore, the equations which use both the size and balance sheet strength variables confirm the hypothesis that the sensitivity of lending volume to monetary policy is greater for smaller banks with weaker balance sheets.
In all estimated equations, the coefficient of the spread variable is positive and significant (at the 5 percent level 12 ), providing evidence of imperfect substitutability between loans and securities in bank portfolios. 13 Thus, the panel data allow the identification of the loan supply function, which is critical to the operation of the lending channel. Finally, the estimated coefficient of reversion (φ 1 ) is statistically significant and implies that the halflife of a deviation from equilibrium is about two years. This is a plausible result given that during the sample period about 40 percent of total bank loans to the private sector were long-term with an estimated average maturity of about 8 years.
A second issue on which we focus is the possible bias due to the endogeneity of the deposits variable. To correct for such bias, we used an instrumental variable estimator for deposits. The instruments used were lagged values of loans and deposits and the contemporaneous and lagged values of the interest rate spread and GDP. Correcting for endogeneity bias does not essentially alter the basic conclusions derived from the above estimation, although the importance of the bank lending channel appears to have strengthened somewhat, as judged by the size of the estimated coefficient of the spread and the significance of shift factors represented by bank differential characteristics. 
Conclusions
The use of bank level data has recently supplemented the empirical analysis of the role of bank lending in monetary transmission with aggregate data. Moving away from the aggregate data, a number of studies have addressed the issue that monetary policy actions may affect banks' loan supply function, by testing the cross-sectional implications of the lending view.
In this paper two approaches have been taken. One employing a reduced form equation linking monetary policy and distributional variables, as well as their interaction, to bank loans in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein's work. This equation was estimated by using panel data for Greek banks covering the second half of the 1990s and two indicators of cross-sectional differences: a size indicator, differentiating large from small banks, and an indicator of the health of bank balance sheets. The results, while compatible with the existence of a bank lending channel, were in general not satisfactory. In an alternative approach, it was argued that bank heterogeneity, though useful in interpreting loan supply shifts, is not the only element on which to base the analysis of the effectiveness of the lending channel. By bringing together some of the features of the Bernanke -Blinder model with a methodology for assessing the impact of differential balance sheet characteristics on banks' ability to supply loans, we investigated directly the behaviour of bank loan supply.
The empirical results of this second approach show that monetary policy clearly has a significant impact on the supply of bank loans and, through shifts in supply, on aggregate economic activity in Greece. Bank data helped us identify a loan supply function, a task that presents well-known difficulties for researchers. The response of loan supply to the interest rate spread is one of the critical parameters in the Bernanke-Blinder model that relates to the degree of substitutability between loans and securities (for banks) and thus to the significance of the lending channel. In addition, bank-specific characteristics were found to systematically shift the loan supply function. The results showed that large banks can, to a certain extent, shield their loan portfolio from monetary policy changes. Similar results hold for the more liquid (healthy) banks.
14 The relevant results are available on request. * indicates rejection of hypothesis of no co-integration at the 1% significance level. 
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